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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code §78A-3-
102(3)0). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue: Whether the trial court erred when it granted judgment as a matter of law 
and ruled that there were no genuine issues of material fact from which a fact-finder 
could have decided this matter in favor of Appellant Charles Pugh by finding there was a 
valid basis for Appellant's lien on Appellee Richard Pratt's property. 
Standard of Review: "[I]n reviewing a district court's grant of summary 
judgment, an appellate court cview[s] the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn 
therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party,'...and cedes no deference to 
the lower court's legal conclusions." N.M. ex rel. Caleb v. Daniel E., 2008 UT 1, | 5 , 175 
P.3d 566 (citations omitted). 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS OF LAW 
Utah R. Civ. P. 56; Utah Code Ann. §§ 38-9-1 to - 7. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case: This is an appeal of the Final Order granting 
summary judgment to Petitioner, entered by the Honorable Fred D. Howard, Fourth 
Judicial District Court on December 23, 2008. 
B. Course of the Proceedings Below: This wrongful lien action was 
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commenced on November 13, 2006, wherein Richard Pratt (hereinafter "Pratt") filed a 
Petition to Nullify Lien with an accompanying Affidavit in support against Charles Pugh 
(hereinafter "Pugh"). (R. 3). A hearing was held on Pratt's Petition to Nullify Lien on 
November 27, 2006 at which, Pratt was granted default on grounds of Pugh's failure to 
appear. (R. 23). However, Pugh had not been served at the time of the hearing, thus the 
parties entered into a Stipulation to Set Aside the Ruling on December 12, 2006. (R. 25). 
Pugh answered and filed an Objection to Petition to Nullify Lien on January 25, 
2007. (R. 40). A second hearing on the Petition to Nullify Lien was held on January 26, 
2007 before Honorable Fred. D. Howard, at which the Court deferred ruling on the 
Petition and set the matter for a telephone conference. (R. 80). On March 16, 2007, a 
telephonic status conference was held, at which, the court set the matter for a three-hour 
evidentiary hearing for May 2, 2007. (R. 137). At the May 2, 2007 evidentiary hearing, 
the court did not take testimony, but instead instructed the parties to take depositions of 
all the parties and witnesses. (R. 164). 
Over the course of the following four months both parties conducted significant 
discovery. (R. 165-583). Pratt filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on September 18, 
2007. (R. 475). Pugh then filed an Objection to Petitioner's Motion for Summary 
Judgment on October 2, 2007. (R. 479). Subsequently, Pugh filed A Motion to Dismiss 
on November 27, 2007. (R. 585). On December 17, 2007 a hearing was held on Pratt's 
Motion for Summary Judgment at which, the Court entered judgment for Pratt. (R. 798). 
-2-
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The Final Order in this matter was filed with the court on December 23, 2008. (R. 855). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. The April 2006 contracts and interactions between Pugh and his business 
partners, and Pratt and his business partners, are currently being litigated in a companion 
case, Fourth District Court case number 060101257. (R. 48). 
2. In that case, Pugh and his business partners, and Pratt and his business 
partners have claims against one another regarding the validity of the April 2006 contracts 
and fraudulent actions directly related to the liens in this case. (R. 48). 
3. Despite the above case already addressing all issues involving the liens and 
the contracts associated with liens, Pratt brought this wrongful lien action under contract 
principles already being addressed in the other case. (R. 82). 
4. The liens at issue in this case came about as part of a business deal wherein 
Pugh's business partners would lend Sovren Group, LLC (hereinafter "Sovren") and Pratt 
$500,000. (R. 40). 
5. Pratt's main role in the parties business transaction was to provide a 
guaranty for the contracts, and real estate security for the $500,000 loan utilizing Pratt's 
two pieces of real property. (R. 40). 
6. In furtherance of the parties agreements, a Guaranty Agreement and 
Security Agreement (hereinafter "Security Agreement") was executed and signed by Pratt 
authorizing his properties to be encumbered securing the $500,000 loan. (R.l 12). 
-3-
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7. Simultaneous to the execution of the Security Agreement, Pratt and Sovren 
executed trust deeds and caused Guardian Title to file them with the Utah County 
Recorder. (R. 516, 93, Addendum J). 
8. Upon receipt of the signed Security Agreement, Pugh released the 
$500,000.00 held at Guardian Title to Pratt and Sovren. (R. 655, 688). 
9. As part of closing the loan and securing it with Pratt's real properties, Pratt 
signed U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) Settlement 
Statements for each of Pratt's properties. (Addendum J, H). 
10. To date Pratt and his business partner Sovren have not paid the $500,000 
back or complied with the terms of the contracts entered into. (R. 42). 
11. Pratt and Sovren entered into Investment Agreements outlining their 
contractual relationship with each other. (R. 635). 
12. Pratt testified in his initial Affidavit in this case that "as collateral for an 
investment agreement, I allowed the two properties to be encumbered by 
Respondent." (R. 4). 
13. Moreover, Pratt testified in his deposition that "the collateral for the 
investment agreement, which Charles Pugh provided $500,000 for, I provided 
security for that by putting these two properties up." (R. 511). 
14. Pursuant to the Investment Agreements between Pratt and Sovren, Pratt 
received a "security interest in and an equity position in ten (10) tons of Maker's 
-4-
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(Sovren) high grade concentrate ore." (R. 511). 
15. Pratt testified the ores are worth "six hundred thousand to a million 
dollars a ton . . . ." (R. 629). 
16. Also, Pratt's property taxes on his two properties, used to secure the 
$500,000 loan, were paid off from the loan monies. (Addendum J). 
17. Pratt testified in his deposition that he believes the Investment Agreements 
are currently valid contracts. (R 515). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. RICHARD PRATT SIGNED A SECURITY AGREEMENT AND 
AUTHORIZED LIENS TO BE RECORDED ON HIS 
PROPERTIES, THEREBY ELIMINATING WRONGFUL LIEN 
TREATMENT PURSUANT TO § 38-9-1 UTAH CODE ANN. 
The liens at issue in this case are not wrongful under Utah Code Ann. § 38-9-1 et 
seq., the Wrongful Lien Act, as Pratt authorized the liens, at the time of their filing, 
through signed documents. Pratt signed a security agreement allowing the 
properties to be encumbered, signed Settlement Statements for each property, 
and gave sworn testimony that he allowed the properties to be encumbered. The 
statute is unambiguous and the Court should not look to contract principle to 
determine if a lien is wrongful under the Wrongful Lien Act.. 
II. RICHARD PRATT'S CONTINUED BAD FAITH THROUGHOUT 
THIS ACTION WARRANTS THE AWARD OF COSTS AND 
REASONABLE ATTORNEY'S FEES TO CHARLES PUGH. 
-5-
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The Wrongful Lien Act provides that a court may award costs and reasonable 
attorney's fees to a lien claimant when the court determines that the claim of lien is 
valid. Utah Code Ann. § 38-9-6(3). Richard Pratt brought this action in bad faith 
knowing that he had signed documents authorizing the liens to be recorded on 
his properties. Moreover, As a result of Pratt's extensive bad faith, this action has 
been excessively prolonged, resulting in the unnecessary accumulation of 
significant costs and attorneys fees, thus warranting the award of costs and 
reasonable attorney's fees to Charles Pugh. 
ARGUMENT 
I. RICHARD PRATT SIGNED A SECURITY AGREEMENT AND 
AUTHORIZED LIENS TO BE RECORDED ON HIS 
PROPERTIES, THEREBY ELIMINATING WRONGFUL LIEN 
TREATMENT PURSUANT TO § 38-9-1 UTAH CODE ANN. 
The liens at issue in this case are not wrongful pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 38-9-
1 et seq.? the Wrongful Lien Act, as Pratt authorized the liens, at the time of their filing, 
through signed documents. The Wrongful Lien Act found at § 38-9-1(6) Utah Code 
Annotated provides in pertinent part: 
(6) "Wrongful lien" means any document that purports to create a lien or 
encumbrance on an owner's interest in certain real property and at the 
time it is recorded or filed is not: 
« • • • • ' . * * * 
(c) signed by or authorized pursuant to a document signed by the 
owner of the real property 
-6-
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The Wrongful Lien Act is a "summary proceeding" and "is limited in a 
number of respects." Anderson v. Wilshire Investments, L.L.C., 123 P.3d 393, 396 
(Utah 2005). The Wrongful Lien Act is express in limiting its application stating 
that: 
(4) A summary proceeding under this section is only to determine 
whether or not a contested document, on its face, shall be recorded 
by the county recorder. The proceeding may not determine the truth 
of the content of the document nor the properly or legal rights of the 
parties beyond the necessary determination of whether or not the 
document shall be recorded. Utah Code Ann. § 38-9-6(4) 
Moreover, the Wrongful Lien Act expressly states that the court may "only 
determine whether or not a document is a wrongful lien" and "shall not 
determine any other property or legal rights of the parties nor restrict other legal 
remedies of any party." Id. § 38-9-7(4). 
The Wrongful Lien Act is unambiguous with regard to what constitutes a wrongful 
lien and what a court should consider when determining if a lien is wrongful. The Utah 
Supreme Court has long held that "(w)here statutory language is plain and unambiguous , 
this Court will not look beyond the same to divine legislative intent." Brinkerhoffv. 
Forsyth, 779 P.2d 685, 686 (Utah 1989). The Court in that case continued, stating that it 
is "guided by the rule that a statute should generally be construed according to its plain 
language." Id. 
Under the plain language of the Wrongful Lien Act, the trust deeds at issue 
-7-
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in this matter were clearly authorized pursuant to a signed document at the time 
of their filing. On April 11, 2006, Pratt and his business partners executed two 
trust deeds and caused them to be recorded through their title agent, Guardian 
Title, with the Utah County Recorder. (R. 93). The trust deeds were recorded by 
Pratt pursuant to a Security Agreement signed by Pratt on April 10, 2006. (R. 
112). Pratt's property was security for financing in the amount of $500,000, which 
funds were transferred by Pugh to Pratt and Sovren upon receipt of the signed 
security agreement. (R. 655, 688). 
Clearly, the recorded trust deeds are not wrongful under the Wrongful 
Lien Act. The trust deeds were executed by Pratt and Sovren, and were 
authorized pursuant to a document signed by Pratt, the security agreement, at 
the time they were filed. (R. 516, 93). Furthermore, Pratt has never denied that he 
signed the security agreement and executed the trust deeds. Moreover, the trust 
deeds, which Pratt contends are wrongful, were filed by Pratt and his agents, and 
were never even viewed by Pugh prior to their filing. (R. 516, 93). 
As further evidence that the trust deeds filed were authorized by a signed 
document and not wrongful, Pratt signed U.S. Department of Housing and 
Urban Development (HUD) Settlement Statements (hereinafter "Settlement 
Statements7') for each of his properties. (Addendum J, K). The Settlement 
-8-
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Statements were drafted by Pratt's agent, Guardian Title, and integrated at the 
closing of the $500,000 loan from Pugh and his business partners. Id. Each 
Settlement Statement, signed by Pratt, clearly outlines the contractual 
relationship of the parties, the allocation of the loan monies to Pratt, and payment 
of the recording fees for the trust deeds. Id. These Settlement Statements were 
drafted, executed, and carried out without the presence of Pugh. Pratt's 
contention that the liens are wrongful is not only wholly unfounded, but entirely 
disingenuous. 
Not only are the signed documents evidence enough of the trust deeds 
being valid under the Wrongful Lien Act, but Pratt has testified on more than one 
occasion that the trust deeds were authorized by him. (R. 4, 571). Pratt even 
testified in his original Affidavit in this case that "as collateral for an Investment 
Agreement, I allowed the two properties to be encumbered by Respondent." (R. 
4). Moreover, when asked what he meant by the above statement, Pratt testified 
in his deposition that "the collateral for the investment agreement, which Charles 
Pugh provided $500,000 for, I provided security for that by putting these two 
properties up." (R. 511). 
Pratt, in his Motion for Summary Judgment, has asked the court to look 
beyond the plain language of the statute, and apply contract principles to 
-9-
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determine if the liens were wrongful at the time they were recorded. The 
misguided basis for Pratt's Motion for Summary Judgment, is that because Pugh 
had repudiated the underlying contract after discovering Pratt's and other 
parties' fraud, there was no "meeting of the minds" to validate the parties 
contracts, therefore the liens are wrongful. This contention is irrelevant to a 
determination of wrongful lien under the Wrongful Lien Act cited above. 
Contract principles do not govern the Wrongful Lien Act, as it was not created to 
resolve disputes concerning parties respective property interests. The 
mechanism for determining a wrongful lien is not whether the underlying 
contract is valid, but is simply whether the "document," "on its face," when 
recorded was authorized pursuant to a signed "document." The Wrongful Lien 
Act does not even require there be a contract. 
The reason the statute is limited in its scope and only requires that the 
Court look to see if a document "on its face" is authorized at "the time it is 
recorded," is that the statute only provides a quick summary proceeding to 
combat liens that were clearly inappropriate at the time of their filing. The 
wrongful lien act was not enacted as a "catch-all" lien statute to encompass every 
area of law foreseeably related to a lien. Clearly, the trust deeds recorded on 
Pratt's property are not wrongful liens under the Wrongful Lien Act. Pratt 
-10-
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signed a security agreement authorizing his two properties to be encumbered, 
signed Settlement Statements for each property, and gave sworn testimony that 
he allowed the properties to encumbered. The statute is unambiguous and the 
Court should not look to contract principle to determine if a lien is wrongful 
under the Wrongful Lien Act. 
II. RICHARD PRATT'S CONTINUED BAD FAITH THROUGHOUT 
THIS ACTION WARRANTS THE AWARD OF COSTS AND 
REASONABLE ATTORNEY'S FEES TO CHARLES PUGH. 
Richard Pratt brought this action in bad faith knowing that he had signed 
documents authorizing the liens to be recorded on his properties. Furthermore, 
as a result of Pratt's extensive bad faith, this action has been excessively 
prolonged, resulting in the unnecessary accumulation of significant costs and 
attorneys fees, thus warranting the award of costs and reasonable attorney's fees 
to Pugh. The Wrongful Lien Act provides that "[i]f the court determines that the 
claim of lien is valid, the court shall dismiss the petition and may award costs 
and reasonable attorney's fees to the lien claimant." Utah Code Ann. § 38-9-6(3). 
Although the Wrongful Lien Act only provides the possibility of the Respondent 
being awarded attorney's fees by stating "may," Pratt's bad faith throughout this 
action warrants an award of costs and reasonable attorney's fees to Appellant. Id. 
Throughout this proceeding Pratt has made misstatements, contradicted 
himself in testimony, and tried to circumvent the legal system by bringing a 
-11-
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Petition to Nullify Lien on grounds currently being litigated in another case. Pratt 
brought this case pursuant to a Petition to Nullify Lien and Affidavit of Pratt 
wherein Pratt stated that he "allowed the two properties to be encumbered by 
Respondent." (R. 4). This sworn statement is, in effect, the death knell to a claim 
of wrongful lien under the Wrongful Lien Act. Furthermore, Pratt's facts and 
argument in his original and amended Petitions seek the removal of the lien 
under contract theory. Yet, despite Petitioner's Petition to Nullify Lien being 
devoid of any facts supporting a finding that the trust deeds were wrongful 
pursuant to the Wrongful Lien Act, Pratt continued to make misstatements and 
further the litigation causing Pugh significant attorney's fees. 
Pratt's inaccuracies in his testimony are apparent from the outset of this 
case. In his initial Affidavit Pratt testified that Pugh "repudiated said investment 
agreement and has not loaned said money to me as required by the security 
agreement." (R. 4). This testimony of Pratt is clearly false and misleads the 
Court as to the true facts of the case. First, Pugh never entered into an 
"investment agreement" with Pratt as Pratt testified. The "Investment 
Agreement" referenced by Pratt was solely between Pratt and his business 
partner Sovren. Pugh, nor his business partners, were not at any time a part of 
Pratt's and Sovren's agreement. The plain language of the Investment 
-12-
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Agreement is evidence enough that Pugh, nor his business partners, were not 
parties to the contract. Furthermore, there were two Investment Agreements 
executed between Pratt and Sovren. Pratt and Sovren executed an Investment 
Agreement for each of the two parcels of property used as security for the 
$500,000 loan. 
Furthermore, Pratt inaccurately testified that Pugh did not pay pursuant to 
the parties agreements. Although the contracts associated with the transfer of the 
$500,000 are in dispute in the companion case, Pugh transferred $500,000 to Pratt 
and Sovren pursuant to the parties agreements. In fact, Pratt and his business 
partners still have Pugh's and his business partner's $500,000, the collection of 
which is currently being litigated in the companion case. Moreover, the 
Settlement Statements executed at the closing of Pughs $500,000 loan clearly 
outline where the loan monies were allocated. The Settlement Statements 
expressly note that Pratt received the loan and that, among other things, his 
property taxes were paid with the loan monies. For Pratt to execute such 
documents and then in turn file a Petition to Nullify Lien, representing to the 
Court that he at no time authorized the recording of the trust deeds, clearly 
shows Pratt's bad faith. 
After the initial hearing where it became apparent that Pratt's first Petition 
-13-
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and sworn statements only validated the liens, Pratt amended his Petition in an 
attempt to fix the problems in his initial Petition. In his Verified Amended 
Petition, despite the plain language of the Investment Agreements, Pratt again 
testifies that Pugh was a part Pratt's and Sovren's Investment Agreements. Pratt 
further testifies in the Verified Amended Petition that Pugh had not complied 
with the terms of the Investment Agreements and therefore the liens were 
wrongful. This statement is not only entirely inaccurate, but again misleads the 
Court as to the contractual relationship of the parties. As explained above, Pugh 
was not a party to the Investment Agreements between Pratt and Sovren. Yet, 
Pratt is trying to assert that Pugh should be held to the Investment Agreements' 
terms. These arguments are blatantly invalid, brought in bad faith, and are 
meritless to a determination of a liens validity under the Wrongful Lien Act. 
Moreover, Pratt has stated numerous times in his papers that Pugh "placed 
the liens on Petitioner's property," yet it was Pratt and Sovren that executed the 
trust deeds and caused Guardian Title to record them with the Utah County 
Recorder. (R.516, 93, Addendum J). Pratt even admits in his deposition that his 
title agent recorded the trust deeds. (R. 516). These misleading statements 
unjustly influence the Court into thinking that the liens were inappropriately 
filed by Pugh when, in fact, Pugh had not even seen them prior to their filing. 
-14-
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Pratt's bad faith is also apparent in Pratt's very argument that the liens are 
wrongful. Pratt's Amended Petition contains two arguments for the lien being 
wrongful under the Wrongful Lien Act. First, Pratt argues that Pugh "failed to 
meet the conditions of the agreement (Investment Agreement) ." As explained 
exhaustively above, Pugh was not even a party to the Investment Agreements, 
thus the argument that the trust deeds are wrongful because of failing to comply 
with the Investment Agreements is meritless. 
Secondly, Pratt argues that because there was no "meeting of the minds/ ' 
the Security Agreement, signed by Pratt authorizing the liens, is invalid. (R. 82-
121). This second argument is not only meritless in determining if a lien is 
wrongful pursuant to the Wrongful Lien Act, but is brought in bad faith. Pratt 
argues that because Pugh repudiated the underlying contracts, after Pugh found 
that the contracts were materially altered, there was never a valid contract 
between the parties, rendering the liens invalid. However, this argument is 
disingenuous and brought in bad faith, as Pratt has derived a benefit from the 
underlying contracts and is attempting to circumvent his liability in the 
companion case through this action. 
Pratt's position that the underlying contracts and liens are invalid is in 
direct contradiction to the fact that he has derived a benefit from them, and has 
-15-
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testified that the Investment Agreements are valid entitling him to all benefits 
contained therein. As explained above, the Investment Agreements outline the 
contractual relationship between Pratt and Sovren. In exchange for providing 
security for the $500,000 loan with his two properties, Sovren contracted to give 
Pratt a "security interest in and an equity position in ten (10) tons of Maker's 
(Sovren) high grade concentrate ore/7 (R. 635) Pratt believed the ores to be 
worth "six hundred thousand to a million dollars a ton . . . ." (R. 629). 
Furthermore, not only does Pratt have interest and security in ore worth up to 
ten million dollars ($10,000,000) as a result of securing Pugh $500,000 loan to 
Sovren, but Pratt recieved a "2% interest in the real estate entity known as 
Housing Partnership, . . . 1% ownership in a new established bank, and 1% stock 
options." (R 635). Pratt also had his property taxes paid out of the $500,000 loan 
monies. (Addendum J). 
Pratt's contradictory and specious testimony accomplishes nothing less 
than to allow him to have his cake and eat it too. If Pratt were allowed to side 
step liability by removing the liens by claiming the contracts are invalid, while 
asserting a right to collect on the Investment Agreements, he would receive a 
financial windfall, leaving Pugh and his business partners with no security for 
their $500,000 loan. These statements by Pratt are further evidence of Pratt's 
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significant bad faith throughout this proceeding. 
Pratt has continually mislead the court, given contradictory testimony, and 
made meritless arguments using inaccurate information. The aforementioned 
actions of Pratt were clearly in bad faith and resulted in months of discovery and 
the unnecessary accrual of significant costs and attorney's fees. 
CONCLUSION 
For the above reasons, it is respectfully submitted that the Trial Court's granting of 
summary judgment in favor of the Petitioner be overturned, that judgment be entered on 
behalf of the Respondent holding the liens valid, and Respondent be awarded costs and 
reasonable attorney fees. 
DATED this day of November, 2009. 
JAMES C.HASKINS 
GRAHAM J. HASKINS 
Attorneys for Charles Pugh 
-17-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the day of November, 2009,1 caused to be served 
by HAND DELIVERY a true and correct copy of the foregoing Appellant's Brief, as 
follows: 
Ron D. Wilkinson 
815 East 800 South 
Orem,Utah 84097 
-18-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
